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
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THE BRAIN DRAIN AND INCOME TAXATION: A PROPOSAL*

by

Jagdish Bhagwati and William Dallalfar

Number 92

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THE BRAIN DRAIN AND INCOME TAXATION: A PROPOSAL

I: Welfare Loss to LDC's

The analytical literature on the brain drain from LDC's has been heavily dominated by the neoclassical mode of reasoning (cf. Grubel and Scott, 1971) which essentially posits that "a man carries away his marginal product," leaving those left behind no better or worse off;* and that the only case for interfering with the "brain drain" on behalf of LDC's must be developed as an exception to this basic proposition.

"Exceptions," however, can be more significant than the "rule." And there is good reason to think that, in the kinds of categories of professional manpower where concern is expressed by LDC's, this is indeed so. Do doctors earn the "value of their social marginal product" when there are over 20,000 people per doctor? ** Do gifted professors contribute only as much to LDC's as they earn? *** The "externalities" surely run high on these kinds of manpower. And, if one takes as the relevant reference point the continuing

* This is valid, of course, only for infinitesimal changes. For "large" changes, there will necessarily be a loss for the LDC's, depending on the extent of diminishing returns to professional manpower.

** Admittedly, if the doctors are not spread out to the heavily populated rural areas but congregate in the few urban areas, the social marginal product will be smaller. A country such as China, with a more egalitarian and centralised policy in the matter of locating the available medical resources, will thus do better (on our ethical preferences) than a country such as India without such policies.

*** This is not to deny that, in some cases, the "drained" manpower may still work to the benefit of the LDC of origin: as when an Indian economist at MIT researches on developmental problems; or that the gifted scientist may inspire his countrymen more effectively with greater achievements from afar than when he is working at home without the latest facilities; or that the brain is not a static concept and that it can drain away rapidly sitting in one place in an LDC in an uncongenial intellectual climate.

presence of these kinds of manpower in the LDC's as against their shift to the DC's, the LDC's indeed lose the difference between the social and the private marginal products of such manpower.

Nor do these analytical models allow for the fact that the international integration of skilled manpower tends to push up salaries in the LDC's. It is arguable that salary levels in the professional classes are set by "non-economic" factors such as the "demonstration effect" of salaries and consumption levels elsewhere, brought into sharp focus by professional migration possibilities which define aspirations and opportunity costs to potential migrants.* The costs of such escalation in the salary levels of the skilled and/or professional manpower are to be seen, not merely in the serious income inequality that it entails between those who are employed at these salary levels and those who are either unemployed or employed at levels below the per capita income level, but also in the fact that these high levels of income, given the much-lower average productivity of labour in the system, invite competition for acquiring the necessary "attributes" for qualifying for such "prizes": thus leading to the waste of real resources in the form of creation of unemployment, a la Harris-Todaro (19), and overexpansion of educational facilities.** And note that these real costs to the LDC's from

* Two other contributory factors may be noted. (i) Rene Dumont (19) has observed that, in French Africa, the native African civil servants took over the salary levels of the departing French colonial civil servants, a phenomenon that has occurred in other colonial LDC's as well; and (ii) multinational corporations, which either voluntarily hire native professionals at "international" or "near-international" salaries or are forced to do so under "indigenous quota" policies of host LDC's, also escalate the salary levels of resident native professionals: in this, they are preventing migration of such professionals but are paradoxically leading to the same effect as the migration would have on the salary levels of such manpower.

** These problems have been studied analytically by Bhagwati, Hamada and Srinivasan (1972) (1972), in forthcoming papers which study the effects of "unduly high" salary levels within models which adjust the labour market for professional manpower by unemployment which equates the expected wage in the professional market with the actual wage in the "unskilled" market.

which brain drain occurs, do not accrue from "externalities" in the sense discussed above but from the accentuation of a "distorted" salary level to which the migration of skilled manpower leads. These costs therefore pertain to far wider classes of professional manpower than the costs arising from externalities alluded to earlier.

II: Alternative Policy Intervention Rationales

These arguments therefore underline the need to have an intervention policy regarding the migration of professional manpower from the LDC's if one has LDC welfare in mind. A policy of preventing migration is, in our view, not appropriate because we feel that migration is not necessarily induced by economic reasons of self-advancement to which one may attach low weight; that, in fact, a substantial part of migration may be induced by "non-economic" reasons, including political difficulties and personal problems arising from the inevitable tension between traditional societal laws and institutions in LDC's and the aspirations and needs of the "modernised" professional classes, and that such migration ought to be permitted in a humanistic international order. At the same time, the action of countries such as the United States, aimed at reducing the size of the problem by imposing the (now-emasculated) requirement that Exchange Visitors return to an LDC for two years prior to readmission to the U. S. and making LDC-based research more attractive by grants to LDC research and university institutions, has been surely ineffective.

It would seem to us, therefore, that a tax policy which both compensates LDC's for the real losses imposed by the brain drain and partially deters the brain drain is called for. An income tax, levied on the "drained" LDC

professional manpower, would achieve precisely this.*

(1) It may be objected that such a tax is inequitable and that it should be collected from the recipient DC's general tax proceeds rather than be localised on the immigrating professionals. But one should recognise that the tax merely amounts to a fractional contribution by the immigrant from the difference between the low LDC salary level and the significantly higher DC salary level that the immigrant is permitted to enjoy when the LDC allows him to migrate to the host DC.**

(2) Another objection might be that the LDC may not have "invested" in the skills acquired by its emigrating nationals and that the LDC therefore should not get a "return" on DC investments in these migrants--as when a Ghanaian student has been on a U. S. fellowship to become a structural engineer at MIT and stays on in the United States. But this argument ignores the facts that the true opportunity cost of the brain drain to the LDC is to be defined in terms of these migrants being denied the permission to migrate and being given it, by the LDC in question; and that the grant of the permission to migrate--essentially in the form of issuing a passport valid for the necessary purpose--entails the real losses that we have discussed, while yielding the migrant a significant (and not necessarily identical) increment in his income, thus making it logical and "fair" that a tax be levied on him to compensate the LDC for its grant of permission to emigrate.

In fact, while we have provided the rationale for our tax proposal in terms of compensation to the LDC for the welfare loss imposed by emigration,

* This proposal has been advanced earlier in Bhagwati (1972).

** Only to the extent that the immigrant benefits the DC, would there be a case for the DC to tax its general population to contribute to the LDC for permitting such migration.

it is perfectly possible to think of the tax alternatively as a means of extracting, from one's own professional manpower, part of the "surplus" that is accruing to it via the act of migration: the LDC then sharing, as a reward for permitting migration to higher-salary areas, in the differential return to the migrant manpower. This latter way of looking at our tax proposal, of course, does not require that the migration (i.e. brain drain) cause a welfare loss to the LDC of origin: rather, the tax is then only an instrument for earning a return on the "export" of professional manpower.

III: Dimensions of a Tax Policy

How can an income tax on immigrants be levied? If one believes in perfect capital markets, the tax on migrants could be levied at the point of migration--whether the migrant leaves for the DC or stays on abroad, the LDC (of origin) could extract the "capitalised" value of the tax over a defined period.

However, capital markets are not perfect and the incidence of such a method of tax collection prior to migration would inevitably be inequitable among potential migrants. It would also be inefficient and inequitable insofar as the tax would have to be computed on anticipated rather than actual income during the period over which the tax is to be levied.

If, therefore, the tax is to be collected after immigration, and on the actual income earned, it makes eminent administrative sense to have it collected by the tax authority of the host DC and eventually handed over to the LDC of origin.* This raises two questions: (1) do the constitutions of

*The collection of the tax by the host DC is more convenient and less costly administratively and more efficient than if the LDC's tried to collect the tax directly themselves. LDC's are inefficient revenue-gatherers even on their home ground and besides their ability to collect a tax of the kind we propose would, even in ideal circumstances, cease once the migrant changed his citizenship.

the DC's allow taxes to be collected on behalf of foreign governments; and (ii) should the revenue transfer be bilateral or under international auspices?

On the former question, clearly the constitutions and/or the unwritten traditions of DC's, are likely to raise some difficulties. But there is surely nothing here that is beyond the possibility of change.

We think further that the change would be easier if the tax were collected under U. N. auspices, to be handed over to a special UNDP account, for example, to be then delivered to the LDC of origin. To minimise the force of the objection that the tax revenue could then wind up with a "hostile" or a "corrupt and dictatorial" LDC regime (e.g. Haiti and South Vietnam), it would be valuable to have a possible vetoing of the allocation of such revenue to specified LDC's but, in that event, for the revenue arising from the migration of these "vetoed" LDC's to be nonetheless collected and paid into the general UNDP account for distribution as developmental aid on general criteria.

The mechanics of such tax collection could involve an additional tax form that would be filled in by professional immigrants, where they would specify the year of immigration, the net taxable income and the tax payment that would follow on "UN account."

How long should an immigrant continue paying such a tax? In principle, it could be over a working lifetime--for that is how long the externalities could have operated; it could even be longer if the "distorting" effects that we discussed were the source of the loss caused to the LDC's or if one were thinking of the tax as a means of extracting a share of the migrant's improved income, made possible by the permission to migrate. In practice, however, it seems unlikely that the host LDC's could be persuaded, in an

DC's

imperfect world, to agree to tax immigrants in this fashion for much longer after immigration gives way to citizenship. To avoid a strong incentive to change citizenship and thus choke off the possibility of immigrants retaining their LDC nationality and probably returning home, it would seem most useful however to have the tax defined on "immigration" rather than on "immigration until change of citizenship."

In the United States, the period of immigration prior to which citizenship applications cannot be filed is five years. An acceptable time limit for the duration of the tax therefore could be ten years of migration.* (Since we have reliable data on professional migration into the U. S. only for 1962-1969, we are constrained to make estimates of the tax collection on the basis of an 8-year duration, as it would be in 1969.) The tax rate could be progressive or proportional. (In the exercise that follows, we use a uniform tax rate of 10 percent.)

IV: Brain Drain into the United States and Income Taxation:

Quantitative Estimates

It is of interest to see what numbers emerge, if we make "realistic" estimates, using actual immigrant numbers and, what looks like, a feasible tax rate. In the following exercise, we use U. S. immigration statistics over 1962-1969 to arrive at the stock of 1969 immigrants by different professional classes. We then estimate the age distribution of these immigrants,

* If we were defining the tax collection on a migrant to be equal to the loss imposed on the LDC by his migration, the tax period would be a function of the tax rate, the rate of discount in the LDC and the time profile of the loss to the LDC. Rather than be "fancifully rigorous" in this way, we are working with "practical" numbers in this paper.

the median incomes in these age-groups in the U. S., and then arrive at the estimated gross (earned) incomes of these immigrants. Next, we compute the corresponding adjusted taxable incomes, multiply these into a 10 percent tax rate and arrive at the estimated 1969 tax collection figure of over \$62 million in the United States: a sum that is over a tenth of the net aid flow from the United States in 1971.

Table 1 presents the available data on the immigration, on U. S. Preference visa, which relates to the immigration of professional manpower qua this category, of persons from different LDC's during 1962 to 1969. Note that these figures relate to gross immigration and do not allow for any possible reverse flow of earlier or the same immigrants.* The data are further classified by four major categories: (i) physicians, dentists and surgeons; (ii) natural scientists; (iii) social scientists; and (iv) engineers.

To arrive at a detailed age distribution of the professional-immigrant population, we had to work with Table 2, which gives the age distribution of the entire (professional and non-professional) immigrant population by 5-year age-groups. We decided (in light of the available 1967-68 distribution of professional immigrants by more aggregated age-groups) that the professional immigrant distribution was likely to be closer to the male distribution of the entire immigrant population, and possibly closer to the distribution therein of the 20-50 age group. We therefore took the age distribution of the entire male immigrant population during 1962-1969 in the 20-50 age group, arriving at the following distribution: 21.6%, 26.6%, 20.3%, 14.6%, 10.8% and 6.6% in

* Note also that the LDC-of-origin classification relates to the last country of residence, rather than to the first. This means that LDC emigres who moves into the U. S. via residence in a DC are omitted.

the age-groups: 20-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44 and 45-49, respectively.* For physicians and surgeons, we used the more aggregated age-group distribution (under 30, 30-44, and over 44 only) for 1968 as the income data into which these were to be multiplied, were available only for these aggregated age-groups anyway.

We next estimated the median incomes of the different professional groups by these age-groups, in 1966, assuming that the immigrants would be earning the median incomes. It is possible that the immigrants earn lower than median incomes; but we would hold that this view reflects experience with non-professional migration and it is entirely possible that the professional immigrant is in a higher-than-median-income position if the more-talented and trained LDC professionals tend to migrate.** Tables 3-5 give the estimated median salaries in the relevant age-groups for the different professional groups we have distinguished.

We next estimate the after-U. S. tax salaries in these classes by assuming that the 1966 observed tax rate in each income group, calculated in Table 6 as the ratio of income tax collected on adjusted gross income in individual income tax returns, should be applied to these estimated professional immigrant salary earnings. Note that our estimate of the resulting personal after-tax income is an underestimate because we have made no adjustments for the "unearned" income that would accrue as the immigrants save and invest, or for the returns that they may be earning in the U. S. on such

* In 1965, the Immigration laws changed and professionals were allowed a special preference. It is therefore conceivable that the relevant distribution which we should use changed in 1965; however, in the absence of any further information, we have decided to treat the effect of this change as of the second order of smalls.

** One exception, however, is certain to be physicians and surgeons where immigrants are subject to restricted entry and their incomes are likely to be lagging behind.

wealth as they may be able to bring away with them, despite exchange controls in LDC's. Table 7 gives the resulting estimates of median after-U.S.-tax incomes for professional immigrants during 1962-1969 in the United States; and Table 8 converts these into estimated total earnings of these immigrants.

By applying a 10 percent tax rate to these after-U.S.-tax incomes, we then get in Table 9 the corresponding estimates of the revenue that would be raised in each group and the total figure of over \$62 million as the sum that would be gathered by our proposed tax in 1969.

Recall that this figure is an overestimate insofar as our immigration figures are gross rather than net of reverse outflow back to the LDC's and some immigrant incomes, especially among the medical groups, are almost certainly likely to be below our assumed median incomes. On the other hand, the figure is on balance certain to be an underestimate because (1) we have used (the available) 1966 incomes and not (the desired) 1969 incomes which are clearly higher at least by the inflationary factor; (2) we have been able to use only the years 1962-1969 instead of the 10-year period we wished to study as defining an appropriate period over which our tax might be levied; (3) our income estimates allow only for earned income; (4) the LDC immigrants are classified only by the last country of residence and hence miss out the LDC immigrants who come via residence in another DC--as with Indian doctors coming to the United States after residence in the United Kingdom; and (5) we have applied the tax rates to after-U.S.-tax incomes but could well have applied them to taxable income itself.

Note finally that our figure, substantial as it is, refers only to the United States. If the proposal were adopted by Canada, United Kingdom, and France, which experience significant immigrations of professional LDC manpower--

Canada taking the spillover from the U. S., and the U. K. and France taking in people from the ex-colonies--the result could well be to raise an annual sum of nearly \$150 million.

And, if the DC's could be persuaded to contribute a "matching" grant, on the broad supposition that the inflow of skilled manpower generally helps them earn externalities at their research institutions, laboratories, etc., we could have a total flow of \$300 million to LDC's in general on this account alone.

Table 1

Immigration of Professional Manpower from LDC's
into the United States, by major categories: 1962-1969

| Country of Last Residence \ Category | Physicians, Dentists, and Surgeons | Natural Scientists | Social Scientists | Engineers |
|---|--|-----------------------|----------------------|-----------|
| Europe | 562 | 52 | 27 | 429 |
| Turkey (includes Asia) | 562 | 52 | 27 | 429 |
| Asia | 5739 | 4151 | 945 | 13,004 |
| Burma | 58 | 25 | 7 | 92 |
| China (and Taiwan) | 180 | 967 | 220 | 2509 |
| Hong Kong | 208 | 288 | 39 | 731 |
| India | 414 | 1022 | 232 | 4236 |
| Indonesia | 50 | 24 | 10 | 70 |
| Iran | 534 | 148 | 32 | 598 |
| Iraq | 47 | 66 | 8 | 167 |
| Israel | 267 | 196 | 73 | 609 |
| Jordan | 28 | 49 | 13 | 117 |
| Korea | 371 | 313 | 135 | 512 |
| Lebanon | 181 | 95 | 23 | 278 |
| Malaysia | 35 | 41 | 5 | 42 |
| Pakistan | 70 | 83 | 13 | 237 |
| Philippines | 3092 | 726 | 91 | 2372 |
| Syrian Arab Republic | 45 | 30 | 8 | 130 |
| Thailand | 67 | 18 | 9 | 79 |
| Vietnam | 7 | 12 | 11 | 45 |
| (Other Asia) | 85 | 58 | 16 | 180 |
| North America | 3603 | 1161 | 329 | 2937 |
| Mexico | 706 | 225 | 74 | 431 |
| Dominican Republic | 394 | 97 | 20 | 192 |
| Haiti | 232 | 42 | 16 | 137 |
| Costa Rica | 55 | 37 | 6 | 69 |

Table 1

| Country of Last Residence | Category | Physicians, Dentists, and Surgeons | Natural Scientists | Social Scientists | Engineers |
|--|----------|--|-----------------------|----------------------|-----------|
| El Salvador | | 49 | 35 | 4 | 27 |
| Guatemala | | 46 | 15 | 8 | 48 |
| Honduras | | 50 | 20 | 4 | 46 |
| Nicaragua | | 43 | 5 | 1 | 32 |
| Panama | | 32 | 11 | 5 | 54 |
| Other North Central America (West Indies) | | 1996 | 674 | 191 | 1901 |
| South America | | 3032 | 875 | 324 | 2522 |
| Argentina | | 952 | 257 | 61 | 652 |
| Bolivia | | 159 | 81 | 10 | 74 |
| Brazil | | 241 | 131 | 44 | 323 |
| Chile | | 91 | 52 | 25 | 182 |
| Colombia | | 874 | 177 | 95 | 596 |
| Ecuador | | 195 | 59 | 20 | 122 |
| Paraguay | | 43 | 8 | 2 | 13 |
| Peru | | 250 | 41 | 23 | 207 |
| Uruguay | | 32 | 9 | 1 | 40 |
| Venezuela | | 166 | 85 | 34 | 266 |
| Other South America | | 29 | 25 | 9 | 47 |
| Africa | | 431 | 341 | 76 | 895 |
| Algeria | | 6 | 2 | 1 | 10 |
| Ethiopia | | 15 | 4 | 3 | 12 |
| Ghana | | 17 | 10 | 2 | 28 |
| Kenya | | 10 | 8 | 4 | 38 |
| Morocco | | 14 | 4 | 2 | 18 |
| Nigeria | | 15 | 20 | 6 | 64 |
| Tunisia | | 13 | 6 | 2 | 4 |
| U.A.R. (Egypt) | | 247 | 240 | 46 | 570 |
| Other Africa | | 94 | 47 | 10 | 151 |

Table 1

Notes:

From the above sources we added the figures for the immigration of scientists, engineers, and physicians for fiscal years 1962-1969.

Note that the data is for immigration from countries of last residence (one year). Thus the immigrants from LDC's who moved to DC's before immigrating to the United States are not included in these sums.

The tables also measure gross immigration, and there are no figures on people who took out immigration visas but later returned home.

Sources:

1. The Brain Drain into the United States of Scientists, Engineers, and Physicians: A Staff Study for the Research and Technical Programs Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, Washington, D. C., 1967. Appendix A, Tables I-V, pp. 17-77.
2. The Brain Drain of Scientists, Engineers, and Physicians from the Developing Countries into the United States. Hearing before a Subcommittee on Government Operations, House of Representatives, Ninetieth Congress, Second Session. Washington, D. C., 1968. Appendix, Table I, pp. 96-108.
3. Annual Indicator of Immigration to the United States of Aliens in Professional and Related Occupations, Fiscal Year 1968. Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, June 1969. Chart 3, pp. 4-28.
4. Annual Indicator of Immigration to the United States of Aliens in Professional and Related Occupations, Fiscal Year 1969. Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, June 1970. Chart 3, pp. 4-27.

Table 2

Immigrants Admitted into U. S., by Sex and Age:
Years Ended June 30, 1960-1969

| Sex and age | 1960-1969 | 1960 | 1961 | 1962 | 1963 | 1964 | 1965 | 1966 | 1967 | 1968 | 1969 |
|-------------------------|-----------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| Number admitted ... | 3,213,749 | 265,398 | 271,344 | 283,763 | 306,260 | 292,248 | 296,697 | 323,040 | 361,972 | 454,448 | 358,579 |
| Under 5 years | 286,020 | 24,098 | 26,204 | 25,494 | 28,991 | 28,394 | 27,674 | 30,750 | 30,949 | 32,587 | 30,879 |
| 5-9 years | 250,006 | 17,523 | 18,924 | 19,076 | 21,621 | 21,362 | 22,146 | 28,562 | 31,605 | 36,919 | 32,268 |
| 10-14 years | 220,460 | 15,386 | 16,434 | 16,544 | 18,006 | 17,147 | 18,642 | 25,034 | 29,076 | 35,039 | 29,152 |
| 15 years | 45,143 | 2,888 | 2,982 | 3,417 | 3,892 | 3,541 | 3,969 | 5,369 | 5,968 | 7,249 | 5,868 |
| 16-17 years | 110,241 | 8,255 | 8,452 | 8,835 | 10,125 | 10,191 | 10,704 | 12,544 | 12,912 | 15,575 | 12,648 |
| 18-19 years | 163,204 | 14,847 | 14,996 | 15,363 | 17,518 | 16,987 | 17,269 | 16,647 | 15,887 | 18,682 | 15,008 |
| 20-24 years | 513,453 | 47,674 | 47,984 | 51,487 | 55,935 | 54,923 | 57,000 | 47,853 | 45,691 | 58,472 | 46,434 |
| 25-29 years | 454,173 | 39,543 | 39,558 | 42,733 | 45,321 | 42,798 | 42,874 | 43,239 | 47,613 | 60,548 | 49,946 |
| 30-34 years | 323,702 | 27,748 | 27,274 | 29,421 | 31,669 | 28,597 | 27,545 | 30,497 | 36,795 | 45,886 | 38,270 |
| 35-39 years | 234,771 | 19,958 | 19,873 | 20,973 | 21,924 | 19,455 | 19,227 | 22,614 | 27,589 | 35,467 | 27,691 |
| 40-44 years | 167,103 | 12,059 | 12,744 | 13,652 | 15,014 | 13,870 | 14,033 | 16,132 | 20,947 | 27,968 | 20,684 |
| 45-49 years | 126,092 | 11,310 | 11,082 | 10,905 | 10,815 | 9,611 | 9,641 | 11,118 | 14,850 | 21,416 | 15,344 |
| 50-54 years | 103,341 | 8,395 | 8,611 | 8,808 | 9,005 | 8,678 | 8,735 | 10,249 | 13,052 | 17,208 | 10,600 |
| 55-59 years | 82,321 | 6,256 | 6,151 | 6,600 | 6,458 | 6,402 | 6,626 | 8,354 | 10,883 | 15,148 | 9,443 |
| 60-64 years | 57,805 | 4,316 | 4,240 | 4,617 | 4,552 | 4,496 | 4,538 | 5,899 | 7,759 | 11,081 | 6,307 |
| 65-69 years | 37,139 | 2,752 | 2,867 | 2,924 | 2,746 | 2,856 | 2,898 | 3,879 | 5,025 | 7,084 | 4,108 |
| 70-74 years | 20,865 | 1,359 | 1,729 | 1,577 | 1,499 | 1,677 | 1,793 | 2,327 | 2,869 | 4,008 | 2,027 |
| 75-79 years | 11,123 | 680 | 834 | 842 | 780 | 805 | 865 | 1,186 | 1,526 | 2,450 | 1,155 |
| 80 years and over | 6,666 | 321 | 394 | 468 | 382 | 445 | 518 | 763 | 971 | 1,659 | 745 |
| Not reported | 121 | 30 | 11 | 27 | 7 | 13 | - | 24 | 5 | 2 | 2 |
| Males | 1,427,308 | 116,687 | 121,380 | 131,575 | 139,297 | 126,214 | 127,171 | 141,456 | 158,324 | 199,732 | 165,472 |
| Under 5 years | 145,610 | 12,299 | 13,203 | 13,126 | 14,882 | 14,539 | 14,112 | 15,627 | 15,695 | 16,478 | 15,649 |
| 5-9 years | 126,480 | 8,570 | 9,604 | 9,735 | 10,876 | 10,724 | 11,268 | 14,447 | 16,210 | 18,668 | 16,378 |
| 10-14 years | 111,397 | 7,731 | 8,295 | 8,313 | 8,945 | 8,691 | 9,466 | 12,778 | 14,801 | 17,767 | 14,610 |
| 15 years | 22,997 | 1,493 | 1,446 | 1,683 | 1,919 | 1,717 | 2,021 | 2,805 | 3,179 | 3,712 | 3,022 |
| 16-17 years | 50,843 | 3,565 | 3,537 | 3,888 | 4,570 | 4,609 | 4,867 | 6,108 | 6,179 | 7,312 | 6,208 |
| 18-19 years | 55,410 | 4,879 | 5,171 | 5,380 | 6,016 | 5,679 | 5,755 | 5,445 | 5,093 | 6,419 | 5,573 |
| 20-24 years | 170,601 | 15,836 | 16,618 | 19,541 | 20,199 | 18,042 | 18,938 | 15,086 | 12,685 | 17,785 | 15,871 |
| 25-29 years | 206,201 | 17,788 | 18,349 | 21,288 | 21,542 | 18,956 | 18,753 | 19,033 | 20,593 | 26,775 | 23,124 |
| 30-34 years | 155,706 | 12,919 | 13,063 | 15,146 | 15,981 | 13,284 | 12,578 | 14,181 | 17,424 | 21,979 | 19,151 |
| 35-39 years | 113,020 | 9,969 | 9,802 | 10,877 | 11,028 | 8,924 | 8,660 | 10,561 | 13,012 | 16,352 | 13,835 |
| 40-44 years | 78,455 | 5,827 | 6,247 | 6,854 | 7,511 | 6,469 | 6,251 | 7,357 | 9,370 | 12,599 | 9,970 |
| 45-49 years | 57,651 | 5,369 | 5,326 | 5,111 | 5,154 | 4,267 | 4,105 | 4,907 | 6,550 | 9,511 | 7,351 |
| 50-54 years | 44,469 | 3,762 | 3,865 | 3,810 | 4,021 | 3,619 | 3,517 | 4,225 | 5,572 | 7,319 | 4,759 |
| 55-59 years | 34,822 | 2,646 | 2,652 | 2,715 | 2,700 | 2,596 | 2,687 | 3,470 | 4,650 | 6,504 | 4,202 |
| 60-64 years | 23,914 | 1,801 | 1,756 | 1,862 | 1,814 | 1,875 | 1,806 | 2,369 | 3,251 | 4,764 | 2,616 |
| 65-69 years | 15,201 | 1,187 | 1,218 | 1,151 | 1,099 | 1,094 | 1,159 | 1,507 | 2,092 | 2,949 | 1,745 |
| 70-74 years | 8,010 | 592 | 732 | 580 | 576 | 655 | 687 | 855 | 1,078 | 1,497 | 758 |
| 75-79 years | 4,078 | 294 | 322 | 343 | 313 | 303 | 328 | 415 | 547 | 832 | 381 |
| 80 years and over | 2,388 | 146 | 168 | 164 | 144 | 167 | 213 | 270 | 339 | 509 | 268 |
| Not reported | 55 | 14 | 6 | 8 | 7 | 4 | - | 10 | 4 | 1 | 1 |
| Females | 1,786,441 | 148,711 | 149,964 | 152,188 | 166,963 | 166,034 | 169,526 | 181,584 | 203,648 | 254,716 | 193,107 |
| Under 5 years | 140,410 | 11,799 | 13,001 | 12,368 | 14,109 | 13,855 | 13,562 | 15,123 | 15,254 | 16,109 | 15,230 |
| 5-9 years | 123,526 | 8,953 | 9,320 | 9,341 | 10,745 | 10,638 | 10,878 | 14,115 | 15,395 | 18,251 | 15,890 |
| 10-14 years | 109,063 | 7,655 | 8,139 | 8,231 | 9,061 | 8,456 | 9,176 | 12,256 | 14,275 | 17,272 | 14,542 |
| 15 years | 22,146 | 1,395 | 1,536 | 1,734 | 1,973 | 1,824 | 1,948 | 2,564 | 2,789 | 3,537 | 2,846 |
| 16-17 years | 59,398 | 4,690 | 4,915 | 4,947 | 5,555 | 5,582 | 5,837 | 6,436 | 6,733 | 8,263 | 6,440 |
| 18-19 years | 107,794 | 9,968 | 9,825 | 9,983 | 11,502 | 11,308 | 11,514 | 11,202 | 10,794 | 12,263 | 9,435 |
| 20-24 years | 342,852 | 31,838 | 31,366 | 31,946 | 35,736 | 36,881 | 38,062 | 32,767 | 33,006 | 40,687 | 30,563 |
| 25-29 years | 247,972 | 21,755 | 21,209 | 21,445 | 23,779 | 23,842 | 24,121 | 24,206 | 27,020 | 33,773 | 26,822 |
| 30-34 years | 167,996 | 14,829 | 14,211 | 14,275 | 15,688 | 15,313 | 14,967 | 16,316 | 19,371 | 23,907 | 19,119 |
| 35-39 years | 121,751 | 9,989 | 10,071 | 10,096 | 10,896 | 10,531 | 10,567 | 12,053 | 14,577 | 19,115 | 13,856 |
| 40-44 years | 88,648 | 6,232 | 6,497 | 6,798 | 7,503 | 7,401 | 7,782 | 8,775 | 11,577 | 15,369 | 10,714 |
| 45-49 years | 68,441 | 5,941 | 5,756 | 5,794 | 5,661 | 5,344 | 5,536 | 6,211 | 8,300 | 11,905 | 7,993 |
| 50-54 years | 58,872 | 4,633 | 4,746 | 4,998 | 4,984 | 5,059 | 5,218 | 6,024 | 7,480 | 9,889 | 5,841 |
| 55-59 years | 47,499 | 3,610 | 3,499 | 3,885 | 3,788 | 3,806 | 3,939 | 4,884 | 6,233 | 8,644 | 5,241 |
| 60-64 years | 33,891 | 2,515 | 2,484 | 2,755 | 2,738 | 2,621 | 2,732 | 3,530 | 4,508 | 6,317 | 3,691 |
| 65-69 years | 21,938 | 1,565 | 1,649 | 1,773 | 1,647 | 1,762 | 1,739 | 2,372 | 2,933 | 4,135 | 2,363 |
| 70-74 years | 12,555 | 767 | 997 | 997 | 923 | 1,022 | 1,106 | 1,472 | 1,791 | 2,511 | 1,269 |
| 75-79 years | 7,045 | 386 | 512 | 499 | 467 | 502 | 537 | 771 | 979 | 1,618 | 774 |
| 80 years and over | 4,278 | 175 | 226 | 304 | 238 | 278 | 305 | 493 | 632 | 1,150 | 477 |
| Not reported | 66 | 16 | 5 | 19 | - | 9 | - | 14 | 1 | 1 | 1 |

Source: 1969 Annual Report of the Immigration and Naturalization Service,
U. S. Department of Justice. Table IIB, p. 54.

Table 3

Median Annual Salaries (\$) for Social Scientists: 1966

| Field | Age | | | | | | | |
|-----------------|--------------|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| | 24 and under | 25-29 | 30-34 | 35-39 | 40-44 | 45-49 | 50-54 | 55-59 |
| Psychology | 7,100 | 8,300 | 9,900 | 11,400 | 12,400 | 13,000 | 13,000 | 12,600 |
| Statistics | -- | 9,500 | 11,000 | 13,000 | 13,800 | 15,000 | 15,700 | 15,200 |
| Economics | 7,500 | 9,200 | 10,500 | 12,500 | 14,600 | 16,000 | 16,500 | 17,000 |
| Sociology | -- | 8,600 | 9,500 | 10,500 | 11,700 | 12,100 | 13,300 | 13,200 |
| Anthropology | -- | -- | 8,800 | 10,000 | 12,000 | 14,000 | 13,400 | 14,500 |
| Median Overall* | 7,100 | 8,600 | 9,900 | 11,400 | 12,400 | 14,000 | 13,400 | 14,500 |

Note: No medians were computed for groups with less than 25 observations. For groups with even numbers of observations, the N/2nd salary from the lowest was used as the median (in subsequent tables as well).

Source: Reviews of Data on Science Resources, NSF 66-34, #11, December 1966, Table 8, p. 8.

Table 4

Median Annual Salaries (\$) for Engineers,
Physicians, and Surgeons: 1966

| Field \ Age | 24 and under | 25-29 | 30-34 | 35-39 | 40-44 | 45-49 | 50-54 | 55-59 |
|--|--------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Engineering | 8,500 | 10,300 | 12,050 | 13,750 | 15,050 | 15,650 | 15,450 | 14,850 |
| Physicians, Surgeons, and Dentists | | 28,400 | 34,800 | | | 28,000 | | |

Notes: The income-age distribution of engineers and doctors was calculated from data on salary-years, taking the distribution after receiving the B. S. for engineers, and the distribution for the earnings-years in practice for physicians. We assumed that engineers receive their B.S. at age 22 and doctors begin practice at age 27. We had no data on dentists' earnings but treated them as physicians and surgeons in the subsequent tables, thus overstating their earnings.

Sources:

1. Professional Income of Engineers, 1966-1967, Engineering Manpower Commission of Engineers Joint Councils, June 1967, p. 11.
2. "Net Earnings Hit an All Time Peak," Medical Economics, December 11, 1967, p. 71.

Table 5

Median Annual Salaries (\$) for Natural Scientists: 1966

| Field \ Age | 24 and under | 25-29 | 30-34 | 35-39 | 40-44 | 45-49 | 50-54 | 55-59 |
|-----------------------|--------------|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Chemistry | 7,300 | 8,500 | 10,300 | 12,100 | 13,500 | 14,700 | 15,000 | 15,000 |
| Physics | 7,500 | 9,000 | 11,100 | 13,800 | 15,600 | 16,500 | 16,600 | 15,700 |
| Mathematics | 8,000 | 8,500 | 11,500 | 13,500 | 15,000 | 15,000 | 14,600 | 14,300 |
| Agricultural Sciences | 6,300 | 6,900 | 8,300 | 9,800 | 10,500 | 12,000 | 12,500 | 13,800 |
| Biological Sciences | 5,600 | 7,200 | 9,500 | 11,500 | 13,400 | 14,500 | 15,000 | 15,600 |
| Earth Sciences | 7,000 | 8,100 | 9,500 | 11,000 | 12,500 | 13,500 | 14,300 | 14,300 |
| Median Overall* | 7,000 | 8,100 | 9,500 | 11,500 | 13,400 | 14,500 | 14,600 | 14,300 |

Note: In groups with an even number of observations, we used the $N/2^{\text{nd}}$ observation after the lowest salary as the median. This gives a downward bias to our numbers.

Source: Reviews of Data on Science Resources, NSF 66-34, #11, December 1966, Table 8, p. 8.

Table 6

Estimated U. S. Income Tax Rates as Percent of Adjusted Gross Income

| Adjusted Gross Income Class (\$) | Estimated Tax Rate as Percent of Adjusted Gross Income |
|-------------------------------------|---|
| Under 1,000 | 0.84 |
| 1,000-1,999 | 4.87 |
| 2,000-2,999 | 7.00 |
| 3,000-3,999 | 7.59 |
| 4,000-4,999 | 8.19 |
| 5,000-5,999 | 8.48 |
| 6,000-6,999 | 8.94 |
| 7,000-7,999 | 9.25 |
| 8,000-8,999 | 9.80 |
| 9,000-9,999 | 10.28 |
| 10,000-14,999 | 11.75 |
| 15,000-19,999 | 14.01 |
| 20,000-49,000 | 18.64 |

Source: Statistics of Income 1966: Individual Income Tax Returns,
U. S. Treasury Department, Internal Revenue Service, Table 42,
p. 93.

Table 7

Estimated After-U. S. Tax Incomes (\$) of
Professional Immigrants: 1966

| Age Field | 24 and under | 25-29 | 30-34 | 35-39 | 40-44 | 45-49 | 50-54 | 55-59 |
|--|-----------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Social Scientists | 6,400 | 7,800 | 8,900 | 10,100 | 10,900 | 12,400 | 11,800 | 12,800 |
| Natural Scientists | 6,400 | 7,300 | 8,500 | 10,100 | 11,800 | 12,800 | 12,900 | 12,600 |
| Engineers | 7,700 | 9,100 | 10,650 | 12,150 | 12,950 | 13,450 | 13,300 | 13,100 |
| Physicians, Surgeons, and Dentists | | 23,100 | 28,300 | | | 22,800 | | |

Source: Calculated from Tables 3-6.

Table 8

Total After-U. S. Tax Income (\$) of Professional Immigrants from LDC's: 1962-1969

| Country of Last Residence | Category | Engineers | Social Scientists | Natural Scientists | Physicians, Surgeons, and Dentists | Total |
|---------------------------|----------|-------------|-------------------|--------------------|------------------------------------|-------------|
| Europe | | 4,421,300 | 235,800 | 449,500 | 14,986,800 | 20,093,400 |
| Turkey (includes Asia) | | 4,421,300 | 235,800 | 449,500 | 14,986,800 | 20,093,400 |
| Asia | | 134,019,200 | 8,253,700 | 35,965,600 | 53,041,300 | 331,279,800 |
| Burma | | 948,200 | 61,100 | 216,100 | 1,546,700 | 2,772,100 |
| China (and Taiwan) | | 25,857,800 | 1,921,500 | 8,358,300 | 4,800,000 | 40,937,600 |
| Hong Kong | | 7,533,700 | 340,600 | 2,489,300 | 5,546,700 | 15,910,300 |
| India | | 43,656,200 | 2,026,300 | 8,833,700 | 11,040,100 | 65,556,300 |
| Indonesia | | 721,400 | 87,300 | 207,400 | 1,333,300 | 2,349,400 |
| Iran | | 6,163,000 | 279,500 | 1,279,200 | 14,240,100 | 21,961,800 |
| Iraq | | 1,721,100 | 69,900 | 570,500 | 1,253,300 | 3,614,800 |
| Israel | | 6,276,400 | 637,600 | 1,694,100 | 7,120,100 | 15,728,200 |
| Jordan | | 1,205,800 | 113,500 | 423,500 | 746,700 | 2,489,500 |
| Korea | | 5,276,700 | 1,179,100 | 2,705,400 | 9,893,400 | 19,054,600 |
| Lebanon | | 2,865,100 | 200,900 | 821,100 | 4,826,700 | 8,713,800 |
| Malaysia | | 432,900 | 43,700 | 354,400 | 933,300 | 1,764,300 |
| Pakistan | | 2,442,500 | 113,500 | 717,400 | 1,866,700 | 5,140,100 |
| Philippines | | 24,445,800 | 794,800 | 6,275,200 | 82,454,100 | 113,969,900 |
| Syrian Arab Republic | | 1,339,800 | 69,900 | 259,300 | 1,200,000 | 2,869,000 |
| Thailand | | 814,200 | 78,600 | 155,600 | 1,786,700 | 2,835,100 |

Table 8

| Country of Last Residence | | Category | Engineers | Social Scientists | Natural Scientists | Physicians, Surgeons, and Dentists | Total |
|--|--|----------|------------|----------------------|-----------------------|--|-------------|
| Vietnam | | | 463,800 | 96,100 | 103,700 | 186,700 | 850,300 |
| Other Asia | | | 1,855,100 | 139,700 | 501,300 | 2,266,700 | 4,762,800 |
| North America | | | 30,268,600 | 2,873,500 | 10,035,100 | 96,080,800 | 139,258,300 |
| Mexico | | | 4,441,900 | 646,300 | 1,944,800 | 18,826,800 | 25,859,800 |
| Dominican Republic | | | 1,978,700 | 174,700 | 838,400 | 10,506,800 | 13,498,600 |
| Haiti | | | 1,411,900 | 139,800 | 363,000 | 6,186,700 | 8,101,400 |
| Costa Rica | | | 711,100 | 52,400 | 319,800 | 1,466,700 | 2,550,000 |
| El Salvador | | | 278,300 | 35,000 | 302,500 | 1,306,700 | 1,922,500 |
| Guatemala | | | 494,700 | 69,900 | 129,700 | 1,226,700 | 1,921,000 |
| Honduras | | | 474,100 | 85,000 | 172,900 | 1,333,300 | 2,015,300 |
| Nicaragua | | | 329,800 | 8,800 | 43,200 | 1,146,700 | 1,528,500 |
| Panama | | | 556,500 | 43,700 | 95,100 | 853,300 | 1,548,600 |
| Other North Central America (West Indies) | | | 19,591,600 | 1,668,200 | 5,825,700 | 53,227,100 | 80,312,600 |
| South America | | | 25,991,600 | 2,829,800 | 7,563,100 | 80,854,000 | 117,238,500 |
| Argentina | | | 6,719,500 | 532,800 | 2,221,400 | 25,386,900 | 34,860,600 |
| Bolivia | | | 762,600 | 87,300 | 267,900 | 4,240,000 | 5,357,800 |
| Brazil | | | 3,328,800 | 384,300 | 1,132,300 | 6,426,700 | 11,272,100 |
| Chile | | | 1,875,700 | 218,400 | 449,500 | 2,426,700 | 4,970,300 |
| Colombia | | | 6,142,400 | 829,700 | 1,529,900 | 23,306,900 | 31,808,900 |
| Ecuador | | | 1,257,300 | 174,700 | 510,000 | 5,200,000 | 7,142,000 |
| Paraguay | | | 134,000 | 17,500 | 69,000 | 1,146,700 | 1,367,300 |
| Peru | | | 2,133,300 | 200,900 | 254,400 | 6,666,700 | 9,355,300 |

| Category | | Engineers | Social Scientists | Natural Scientists | Physicians, Surgeons, and Dentists | Total |
|---------------------------|--|-----------|-------------------|--------------------|------------------------------------|------------|
| Country of Last Residence | | | | | | |
| Uruguay | | 412,200 | 8,800 | 77,800 | 853,300 | 1,352,100 |
| Venezuela | | 2,741,400 | 297,000 | 734,700 | 4,426,700 | 8,199,800 |
| Other South America | | 484,400 | 78,600 | 216,100 | 773,300 | 1,552,400 |
| Africa | | 9,223,800 | 663,800 | 2,947,400 | 11,493,400 | 24,328,400 |
| Algeria | | 103,100 | 8,800 | 17,300 | 160,000 | 289,200 |
| Ethiopia | | 123,700 | 26,200 | 34,600 | 400,000 | 584,500 |
| Ghana | | 288,600 | 17,500 | 86,400 | 453,300 | 845,800 |
| Kenya | | 391,600 | 34,900 | 69,100 | 266,700 | 762,300 |
| Morocco | | 185,500 | 17,500 | 34,600 | 373,300 | 610,900 |
| Nigeria | | 659,600 | 52,400 | 172,900 | 400,000 | 1,284,900 |
| Tunisia | | 41,200 | 17,500 | 51,900 | 346,700 | 457,300 |
| U.A.R. (Egypt) | | 5,874,400 | 401,800 | 2,074,400 | 6,586,700 | 14,937,300 |
| Other Africa | | 1,556,200 | 87,300 | 406,200 | 2,506,700 | 4,556,400 |

Note: The weighted median incomes of these groups are \$10,306; \$8,734; \$8,643.5; and \$26,666.9 respectively. Clearly the first three figures should be underestimates of what the average immigrant in the respective class earns.

Source: Calculated from Tables 1 and 7.

Table 9

Estimated Revenue From a 10 Percent Tax on After-U. S. Tax Income
of Professional LDC Immigrants to the United States

| Country of Last Residence | \$ |
|---------------------------|------------|
| Europe | 2,009,300 |
| Turkey (includes Asia) | 2,009,300 |
| Asia | 33,128,000 |
| Burma | 277,200 |
| China (and Taiwan) | 4,093,800 |
| Hong Kong | 1,591,000 |
| India | 6,555,600 |
| Indonesia | 3,234,900 |
| Iran | 2,196,200 |
| Iraq | 361,500 |
| Israel | 1,572,800 |
| Jordan | 249,000 |
| Korea | 1,905,500 |
| Lebanon | 871,400 |
| Malaysia | 176,400 |
| Pakistan | 514,000 |
| Philippines | 11,397,000 |
| Syrian Arab Republic | 286,900 |
| Thailand | 283,500 |
| Vietnam | 85,000 |
| Other Asia | 476,300 |
| North America | 13,925,800 |
| Mexico | 2,586,000 |
| Dominican Republic | 1,349,900 |
| Haiti | 810,100 |
| Costa Rica | 255,000 |
| El Salvador | 192,300 |
| Guatemala | 192,100 |

Table 9

| Country of Last Residence | \$ |
|---|------------|
| Honduras | 201,500 |
| Nicaragua | 152,900 |
| Panama | 154,900 |
| Other North Central America (West Indies) | 8,031,300 |
| South America | 11,723,900 |
| Argentina | 3,486,100 |
| Bolivia | 535,800 |
| Brazil | 1,127,200 |
| Chile | 497,000 |
| Colombia | 3,180,900 |
| Ecuador | 714,200 |
| Paraguay | 136,700 |
| Peru | 935,500 |
| Uruguay | 135,200 |
| Venezuela | 820,000 |
| Other South America | 155,200 |
| Africa | 2,432,800 |
| Algeria | 28,900 |
| Ethiopia | 58,500 |
| Ghana | 84,600 |
| Kenya | 76,200 |
| Morocco | 61,100 |
| Nigeria | 128,500 |
| Tunisia | 45,700 |
| U.A.R. (Egypt) | 1,493,700 |
| Other Africa | 455,600 |
| Total | 63,219,800 |

Source: Calculated from Table 8.

Postscript

Since we completed this paper, the Soviet Union (August 1972) has announced the imposition of a tax on emigrants, scaling it up by the level of educational attainment. The fact that the incidence of this tax is largely on the Soviet Jewish citizens who wish to emigrate to Israel--and who paradoxically represent both an underprivileged group traditionally within Russia and an overprivileged group in being practically the only group allowed to emigrate at all--has provoked strong reactions from concerned Jewish organizations (as also from the United States politicians in an election year).

It is worth setting out here therefore the critical differences between the Soviet tax and our proposal and refuting some of the propagandistic points made against emigration taxes in general in the heat of the mainly-Western debate over the Soviet tax.

(1) The Soviet Union has justified the tax as compensation for the Soviet investment in the education of the emigrants. We conceive of our tax rather as compensation for the loss imposed by the emigrant on those left behind, or alternatively as a method of earning, for a poor country, a share in the improved income accruing to the emigr  .

(2) The Soviet tax is levied at the point of departure and, unless paid by recourse to foreign sympathisers, is highly likely to be prohibitive and, at best, to be discriminatory between those who cannot raise the large sums specified and the lucky few who can. Our tax is, by contrast, related to the income differential actually accruing to the emigr  , after the act of emigration, and thus avoids these undesirable features of the Soviet tax.

[Of course, in fairness, we should note that it is extremely improbable that

the features of our tax proposal could have been successfully negotiated by the Soviet Union with the Western world.]

(3) It has been alleged that a tax on emigration is a violation of fundamental human rights. This is a fundamentally agreeable position in an ideal world order. But note that this position entails that impediments to immigration are also violations of the fundamental human right to be located where one wishes to be; and characteristically, the stiffest immigration restrictions, frequently of a political and racial nature, are typically practiced by the very same countries and groups which uphold the "fundamental right to emigrate." Morality here tends to reflect self-interest somewhat excessively! In a world composed of nation states, where immigration policies are typically devised to reflect national advantage rather than notions of utopian world order, it surely makes sense for countries to seek suitable restrictions on emigration as well, in their own interest. A tax, of the kind we have proposed, seeks to combine in a suitable way the pursuit of this national self-interest in the poor countries, consistent with maintaining open the possibility of emigration as a value in itself.

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